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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In France,  a DRG-based  payment  system  was  introduced  in  2004/2005  for  funding  acute
services  in  all  hospitals  with  the objectives  of improving  hospital  efﬁciency,  transparency
and  fairness  in  payments  to public  and  private  hospitals.  Despite  the  initial  consensus  on  the
necessity  of  the reform,  providers  have  become  increasingly  critical  of  the  system  because  of
the  problems  encountered  during  the  implementation.  In 2012  the  government  announced
its  intention  to modify  the  payment  model  to better  deal  with  its adverse  effects.
The  paper  reports  on  the  issues  raised  by  the  DRG-based  payment  in the  French  hospi-
tal  sector  and provides  an overview  of  the  main  problems  with  the French  DRG  payment
model.  It also  summarises  the  evidence  on its  impact  and  presents  recent  developments
for  reforming  the current  model.  DRG-based  payment  addressed  some  of  the  chronic  prob-
lems inherent  in the  French  hospital  market  and  improved  accountability  and  productivity
of  health-care  facilities.  However,  it has  also created  new  problems  for controlling  hos-
pital activity  and  ensuring  that care  provided  is medically  appropriate.  In  order to  alter
its adverse  effects  the  French  DRG  model  needs  to better  align  greater  efﬁciency  with  the
objectives of  better  quality  and  effectiveness  of  care.
© 2014  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Policy background
Diagnosis-Related-Groups (DRG) based payment,
which links hospital funding to activity, has become
the most common mode of hospital payment in the
industrialised world over the past decade [1]. This type of
prospective payment, based on the theoretical model of
“yardstick” competition, encourages hospitals to improve
the use of their resources and to optimise care organisa-
tion for improved efﬁciency [18]. It can also contribute to
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process and case management. However, despite common
basic principles, DRG-based payment models can vary
signiﬁcantly in their architecture and implementation
across countries. The accuracy and consistency of the
patient classiﬁcation and costing methods together with
the underlying incentive structure are essential for the
success of the DRG-based funding, and for the realisation
of policy objectives [20].
In France, a DRG-based payment system (called T2A,
Tariﬁcation à l’activité) was  introduced in 2004/2005 for
funding acute services in all hospitals. The major objectives
of the reform were improving hospital efﬁciency, creating a
‘level playing ﬁeld’ for payments to public and private hos-
pitals and improving the transparency of hospital activity
and management. The need for greater transparency and
efﬁciency with better and more autonomous management
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n public hospitals has long been recognised by most stake-
olders. Until 2005, funding arrangements for public and
rivate hospitals were complex with different rules. Pub-
ic hospitals had global budgets, mainly based on historical
osts. Private-for-proﬁt hospitals, which provide more than
alf of all surgery and one fourth of obstetric care in France,
ad a complex itemised billing system complimented with
ee-for service payments [19].
Both public and private hospitals initially supported the
ntroduction of DRG-based payments. Global budgets were
onsidered as a rationing instrument by public hospitals
nd it was expected that activity based payment (ABP)
ould reward more dynamic hospitals. Private hospitals
aw the new system as an opportunity for improving their
arket share. However, this initial consensus on the reform
as faded during the implementation. Several features of
he French DRG-model have been criticised and, in 2012,
he then newly elected Minister of Health recognised that
he French model needed to be modiﬁed to better deal with
ts adverse effects.
The paper reports on the issues raised by the activity-
ased payment in hospital sector in France and provides
n overview of the main problems with the French DRG
ayment model. It also summarises the evidence on its
mpact and presents recent developments for reforming
he current DRG model.
. Issues in adaptation and implementation
In the public sector (public and private not for proﬁt
ospitals), the share of activities covered by DRG payments
ncreased gradually: 10% in 2004, 25% in 2005 and reaching
00% in 2008. In contrast, private for proﬁt hospitals have
een paid entirely by DRG payments since March 2005. The
ajor features of the French DRG payment model and the
ssues raised in implementation are discussed below.
Patient classiﬁcation. The patient classiﬁcation sys-
em used (GHM, Groupe Homogène des Malades) initially
nspired by the US Health Care Financing Administration
lassiﬁcation (HCFA-DRG). It has been modiﬁed three times
ince the introduction of T2A, passing from 600 groups in
004 to about 2300 in 2009 with four levels of case severity
or most GHMs [19]. Continuous modiﬁcations of the clas-
iﬁcation created confusion and reduced the comparability
f the results of the payment system from one year to the
ext. Moreover, the economic pertinence of the latest clas-
iﬁcation has been questioned, as some groups are based
n a very few cases per hospital. It has also been shown
hat 40 GHM covers more than half of all hospital cases in
rance [14].
Cost Data. Reference costs are calculated on the basis
f an annual national cost study (ENCC) which is car-
ied out separately for public and private hospitals. ENCC
rovides detailed cost information for each hospital stay
rom selected hospitals which provide data on a voluntary
asis and according to a detailed standardised account-
ng model [19,23]. Until 2006, the ENCC covered only
ublic and private-not-for-proﬁt hospitals. The number of
articipating hospitals has increased regularly, including
rivate-for-proﬁt hospitals, from 44 in 2005 to 110 in 2012,
epresenting about 16% of hospital cases. However, until(2014) 146–150 147
2010, the reliability of the cost database has been an issue.
Moreover, the methods of calculating reference costs and
the lack of information explaining the cost data have been
criticised severely by the Inspection of Finance [14].
Price setting.  The DRG prices (tariffs) are set annually at
the national level using reference costs separately for pub-
lic and private hospitals. However, the Ministry of Health
sets the ﬁnal prices taking into account the overall bud-
get (expenditure targets) for the acute hospital sector and
national health priorities [23]. Therefore, reference costs
are modiﬁed in a complex and opaque way to compute
ﬁnal GHM prices each year. Tariffs are different for pub-
lic and private hospitals. Moreover, what is covered by the
price differs between public and private sectors. The tariffs
for public hospitals cover all of the costs linked to a stay,
while those for the private sector do not cover medical fees
paid to doctors (paid on a fee-for-service basis) and the
cost of biological and imaging tests which are billed sepa-
rately. The initial objective of achieving price convergence
between the two  sectors, which started in 2010 with about
40 selected GHM was stopped in 2013 as a results of strong
criticism from public hospitals.
Generally, the difﬁculty of understanding the link
between reference costs and prices irritated hospitals as it
made it difﬁcult to predict the evolution of prices and their
budget situation from one year to the next [15]. Moreover,
the ambition of price convergence, which was  supported
by the private hospital federation, has created tension. In
practice, convergence meant price reductions for public
hospitals and steady prices for private ones since tariffs
are based on average costs in areas where the private sec-
tor had a competitive advantage (ambulatory surgery) and
already had a proﬁt margin [11].
Additional payments. Public hospitals receive additional
payments to compensate for speciﬁc ‘missions’, including:
education, research and innovation related activities; activ-
ities of general public interest such as meeting national or
regional priorities (e.g. developing preventive care); and
the ﬁnancing of some investments contracted with the
Regional Health Agencies. The costs of maintaining emer-
gency care and related activities are paid by ﬁxed yearly
grants, plus a fee-for-service element taking into account
the yearly activity of providers. Finally, there are retrospec-
tive payments, covering full costs for a restricted list of
expensive drugs and medical devices.
While there has been progress in improving trans-
parency of allocations for education and research activities
with DRG-based payment, the calculation of budgets to
ﬁnance “public missions” appears to be problematic. The
private sector claims that this budget is used as a mecha-
nism to cover actual efﬁciency deﬁcits of public hospitals,
while public sector hospitals ask for better evaluation (cost-
ing) of the value of their speciﬁc missions. The expenditure
on these budgets (MIGAC) increased by 30% between 2007
and 2010 against a 9% increase in expenditure linked to
activity over the same period [8].
Expenditure control.  To contain hospital expenditure,
national-level expenditure targets for acute care (with sep-
arate targets for the public and private sector) are set by the
Parliament. If the actual growth in total volume exceeds the
target, prices subsequently go down. Evolution of activity
148 Z. Or. / Health Policy 117 (2014) 146–150
volumes
has slightly decreased due to the contraction in inpa-
tient hospitalisations (weighted more in the production
index). In all sectors, better activity coding and changes in
coding habits (optimisation of co-morbidities) could haveFig. 1. Evolution of hospital 
PMSI Hospital statistics, Or et al. [7].
volumes is not followed at individual hospital level but at
an aggregate level (public sector, private sector). Therefore,
GHM prices are set as a function of global changes in hospi-
tal activity, (increasingly) independently of costs and their
evolution at the hospital level.
This macro-level regulatory mechanism created an
opaque environment where it became very difﬁcult for hos-
pitals to predict their budget situation for the next year
as prices change every year as function of overall activity.
The lack of information on the speciﬁc objectives pursued
with payment policy also created frustration and resent-
ment about T2A at the provider level [21,29]. In the absence
of clear price signals and lack of cost data for benchmarking
hospitals, providers appear to be concerned mainly by bal-
ancing their accounts [22].
3. Monitoring and outcomes
Like any form of payment, DRG payments may  induce
undesirable behaviour by providers, adverse effects that
have been widely described in the literature [2–4]. The
selection of patients, up-coding of severity levels, prema-
ture discharge of patients are opportunistic behaviours
often mentioned in the literature. In addition, the efﬁciency
sought at each hospital level may  not always be compatible
with the overall objectives in terms of allocative efﬁciency
and value for money. To maximise revenues, hospitals can
increase activity that is little justiﬁed and alter the com-
position of care by abandoning certain activities deemed
unproﬁtable.
Available data suggest that overall hospital activity
(number of cases treated) has grown regularly (Fig. 1) since
the introduction of T2A [5,6], although public and pri-
vate hospitals followed different strategies [7]. In public
hospitals both the number of cases treated and case-mix
adjusted production have increased signiﬁcantly between
2004 and 2009, and for all types of activities (medicine,
surgery, obstetrics), with a more striking increase in
surgery. In private-for-proﬁt hospitals, a strong increase of by sector (number of cases).
ambulatory procedures and surgery was observed simul-
taneously with a reduction in full-time hospitalisations in
surgery and in obstetrical and medical cases. While pub-
lic sector has improved its market share in surgery, the
private sector (specialised traditionally in elective surgery)
remains the main producer of outpatient surgery. In 2009,
62% of ambulatory surgery was performed by private-for-
proﬁt hospitals.
Globally, there seems to be some positive change in
public sector productivity. The number of public hospi-
tals in deﬁcit has been going down [8]. Average length of
stays went down, in particular for surgery with the devel-
opment of ambulatory surgery while the reduction is less
pronounced for medical and obstetric cases (Fig. 2). In pub-
lic hospitals, technical efﬁciency may  have also increased:
there has been a signiﬁcant increase in case-mix weighted
production between 2005 and 2009 while the number of
total hospital staff rose only modestly [7,16]. In contrast, in
private-for-proﬁt sector the level of weighted productionFig. 2. Average length of stay (days) for surgery, obstetrical and medical
cases.
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n impact on the higher production index. However, the
rowing gap between the public and private sectors in
roduction index (since 2007) indicates different case-mix
rends between the two sectors [7].
DRG creep. Since the classiﬁcation of patients into DRGs
etermines hospital revenues, strong perverse incentives
xist for hospitals to “optimise” their coding practices.
n 2006, a year after the introduction of DRG payments,
ontrols from the Health Insurance Funds demonstrated
hat up-coding of some outpatient procedures as day cases
as a real problem [9]. This problem was solved in 2007
y a decree describing those procedures carried out on
n outpatient basis which should not be coded as day
ases. Moreover, external data quality checks carried out
t the regional level showed that a large number of hospi-
als either intentionally up-coded patients or inadvertently
lassiﬁed patients incorrectly. Between 2006 and 2009,
hree quarters of hospitals were audited at least once and,
mong these, half more than once. In 2006, more than 60%
f inpatient stays (more than 80% for ambulatory episodes)
ad some kind of coding error or inconsistency in pro-
edures billed [10]. If intentional up-coding is detected,
ospitals may  be liable for ﬁnancial penalties of up to 5% of
heir annual budgets. The revenues recovered from these
enalties amounted to D51 million in 2008 and D23 million
n 2010 [8].
Quality. There is no speciﬁc adjustment for quality in
RG payments in France. In several countries adjustments
re made, in particular to control for readmission rates con-
idered as a relevant indicator of hospital quality, since
ayments per case/stay do not give any incentive to pre-
ent readmissions. A recent study suggests that 30-day
eadmissions rates for common medical conditions such
s strokes and myocardial infarction but also colon cancer
nd hip surgery have increased over the period 2007–2009
7]. Nevertheless, in-hospital mortality rates at 30 days, for
he same conditions show a steady decline between 2002
nd 2009, as in other European countries.
Induced demand. It is difﬁcult to prove what is “justiﬁed”
nd what may  be induced demand. Some of the increase in
ctivity can be explained by the increasing demand due to
opulation ageing and dissemination of new interventions
ut also by the improvement in coding hospital activity
24]. However, the strong increase in the aged standard-
sed rates of elective interventions/procedures which are
roﬁtable (such as cataract, endoscopy) compared with the
ates of hip replacement, a heavy intervention difﬁcult to
nduce (as a benchmark), is suggestive of induced demand
hat may  be little justiﬁed [7].
. Recent developments
In 2009, the Auditor’s Ofﬁce [12] pointed out that: (1)
RG-based hospital payment has become a very opaque
echanism of cost control for managers and local regu-
ators; and (2) the follow up of hospital resources, costs
nd quality was insufﬁcient. In 2012, several national
uditing institutions have criticised the French DRG-based
ayment model [13–15]. In addition to the necessity of
mproving transparency of price setting and modifying
acro-level control mechanisms, they pointed out the(2014) 146–150 149
need for simpliﬁcation of the system (including the classi-
ﬁcation), better communication with public hospitals and
better monitoring of results.
At the end of 2012, the Minister of Health set up a formal
commission to reform the French DRG system [25,26]. The
commission works in four areas for improving the current
model. First, it is increasingly recognised that tariffs should
reﬂect the costs of efﬁcient providers. Where relevant, DRG
prices are aligned with the tariffs for ambulatory surgery.
There are also suggestions for adjusting tariffs, where
possible, on the basis of efﬁcient providers [27]. Unfortu-
nately, hospital cost data is currently not used/published
for benchmarking or for identifying efﬁcient providers, in
order to facilitate an understanding of the differences in
medical practices and to monitor changes in behaviour of
various actors. Therefore the size of the potential efﬁciency
gains cannot be established.
Second, the commission proposed to supplement activ-
ity based payment with quality-based funding, in particular
in areas which may  be under-invested (patient follow-
up and coordination, patient safety, etc.). The pilot model,
tested over 2014/15 in about 220 voluntary hospitals, plans
to ﬁnance up to 0.5% of hospital budget based on a series
of quality indicators [28]. The idea is to reward both the
results and the “effort” taking into account the progress
made over time. However, the vast majority of the indica-
tors concern care organisation. Major outcome indicators
such as readmission rates and mortality after surgery are
not monitored; information on patient experience is not
collected either.
Third, the appropriateness of services provided under
the DRG system is being increasingly questioned [15]. DRG-
based payment can foster the development of hospital
activity, sometimes beyond what is medically necessary.
Assuring the appropriateness of care has become a policy
priority, with several institutions tackling the issue. The
High Health Authority (HAS) started to work on developing
clinical guidelines for selected surgery and/or treatments
in hospital. The variations in hospitalisation and surgery
rates across hospitals and regions are also being followed
up more closely now. There are plans to move towards
a more contractual approach with providers, giving clear
volume/price signals for speciﬁc DRGs. The objective is
to reﬁne the current macro-level regulation system with
explicit volume targets for some interventions for which
DRG prices would go down once the target is reached.
Finally, it is recognised that DRG payments, in their
basic form, do not encourage an improvement in care
pathways and may  not be optimal for paying for patients
with chronic illnesses. There are plans to extend payments
beyond acute hospital care and bundling payment for reha-
bilitative services. In 2014, two  chronic conditions (chronic
renal insufﬁciency, radiotherapy in breast and prostate
cancer treatment) will be tested in regional pilots. The idea
is to pay for the overall treatment rather than for each
“session of treatment” as is the case today.5. Conclusion
Overall, the French experience suggests that DRG-based
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and transparency in hospital markets but also present risks.
DRG-based payment addressed some of the chronic prob-
lems inherent in the French hospital market and improved
accountability and productivity of health-care facilities.
However, it has also created new problems for controlling
hospital activity volumes and ensuring appropriateness of
care. In order to alter its adverse effects the French DRG
model needs adjustments to better align greater efﬁciency
with the objectives of better quality and effectiveness of
care. For this, availability of a strong information system
for monitoring both costs and quality of hospital services
is essential. Furthermore, it is necessary to make better use
of the available data and information for benchmarking
cost and quality in order to identify efﬁcient providers
and disseminate good medical/organisational practices.
This needs to be backed up by ﬂexible and transparent
governance which supports continuous ﬁne-tuning of the
incentive structure.
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